By the mid-1980s, much of this enthusiasm was waning, spurred on by the seminal book When Teenagers Work: Psychological and Social Costs of Adolescent Employment by Greenberger and Steinberg (1986) . This and other research published at the time repeatedly found that there may be negative consequences associated with adolescent employment, including but not limited to detachment from parents, poor school performance, and dropout. Some of the more alarming outcomes that were linked to youth employment included an increased risk of alcohol and drug use, delinquency, and other problem behaviors including school misconduct and interpersonal aggression. It was not necessarily employment per se but work intensity (the number of hours of work per week) that was the source of the greatest concern for youth development. In particular, employment more than 20 hrs per week (intensive work) corresponded with the highest risk.
On the basis of this evidence about the possibly harmful effects of intensive employment, a more recent high-level federal commission-the National Research Council (1998)-proposed limiting work for youths ages 16 and 17. Specifically, the National Research Council proposed that the federal government expand the existing limits on youth employment in formal school-year jobs for 14-and 15-year-olds to encompass 16-and 17-yearolds. 1 The National Research Council's recommendation forms the basis for the Youth Worker Protection Act (H.R. 3193; refer to Appendix A for the relevant section). This bill was cosponsored in the 108th Congress by 31 members of Congress and endorsed by the American Federation of LaborCongress of Industrial Organizations, the Child Labor Coalition, and the National Education Association, among others.
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Although ostensibly concerned solely with the number of hours that 16-and 17-year-olds may work during the school year, the Youth Worker Protection Act, if made law, would also have a substantial effect on the types of jobs in which youths are employed. The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) only governs formal work-what may be termed paycheck jobs. It does not regulate informal work, referring to teenage odd jobs such as babysitting and lawn care, which is also very common among adolescents. Formal and informal work are, however, essentially substitutes-youths who face barriers to entry into formal work often shift to the informal labor market. To illustrate, we use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97) to create aggregate patterns of monthly employment by age in formal and informal jobs. These patterns are displayed in Figure 1 . About half (49.0%) of all 15-year-olds work in any given month during the year. Of these workers, just one quarter (26.1%) are employed solely in formal jobs, three in five (61.2%) are employed solely in informal jobs, and only about 12.4% are employed in both formal and informal jobs. Thus, at age 15, three fourths (73.6%) of all workers are employed in the informal labor market (61.2 + 12.4), and even one third (32.2%) of those employed in formal jobs work simultaneously in informal jobs (12.4/[12.4 + 26.1 
]).
This pattern changes dramatically as youths mature, a change that accelerates around age 16 when federal restrictions on work intensity are lifted and state child labor laws are relaxed (Apel, Bushway, Paternoster, & Brame, 2005; Tyler, 2003) . For example, as of 1997, 42 states permit 40-hr work weeks or longer during the school year for 16-and 17-year-olds (Apel et al., 2005) . By age 16, about 55.8% of all youths work in any given month during the year, a marginal increase from age 15 (6.8 percentage points, or 13.9%). However, in the span of just 1 year, more than half (52.9%) of all youth workers are employed only in formal jobs, with 30.5% employed only in informal jobs and 16.7% employed in both formal and informal jobs. Thus, by age 16 . NOTE: Estimates are weighted. At any given month, the sum of the probabilities for formal job only, informal job only, and both formal and informal jobs is equivalent to the probability of any job.
and later, the formal labor market becomes the predominant domain for adolescent workers, with 69.6% of young workers (52.9 + 16.7) formally employed.
Although we cannot know for certain, we predict that passage of the Youth Worker Protection Act would not affect the overall trend in youth employment displayed in Figure 1 (i.e., the line representing any work). Rather, we expect that the proposed act would increase the proportion of youth workers employed in the informal labor market as well as prolong that employment. We base our latter assertion on the fact that the median number of hours worked in the formal market currently for 16-year-olds is more than 20 hrs a week-the maximum permitted by the Youth Worker Protection Act. Given worker behavior prior to age 16, we believe that youths would satisfy their demand for additional hours of work in the informal labor market.
What effect would this shift from the formal to the informal labor market have on young people? Existing research on the problems of work intensity does not differentiate informal from formal work, but recent research has emphasized the importance of job quality and workplace environment on youth outcomes (Staff & Uggen, 2003; Wright & Cullen, 2004) . Informal jobs tend to be less skilled, to have less adult supervision, and to have less structure than formal jobs. On the other hand, formal work might involve greater contact with other workers who might be a positive (or negative) influence on young workers (Wright & Cullen, 2004) .
This article attempts to address the policy implication of the Youth Worker Protection Act and fill a gap in the extant literature by examining the impact of both formal and informal work on delinquency and substance use. Because work patterns, particularly work patterns in informal jobs, tend to be very different by gender and race or ethnicity, we will also disaggregate the effect of employment by gender and race or ethnicity subgroup. The article uses the panel data approach employed by Paternoster, Bushway, Brame, and Apel (2003) to confront the possibility that unobserved differences exist between those that work and those that do not, between those that work in the formal versus informal labor market, and among those who work at varying levels of intensity. This article is thus the first to explore the impact of job type and work intensity across gender and racial or ethnic subgroups using this panel data approach.
In the next section, we summarize previous research on the nature of youth employment with particular emphasis on gender and racial or ethnic differences and how these different employment experiences may translate into different work effects. We then discuss the methods we employ in our current study and finally present our empirical results.
LITERATURE REVIEW The Negative Impact of Intensive Work
Although figures vary depending on the scope of the definition of work and the population under study, researchers agree that most teenagers work. The U.S. Department of Labor (2000, p. 30) has estimated that during the 1996 to 1998 period, 2.9 million youths ages 15 to 17 worked during the school months, and 4.0 million worked during the summer months. Moreover, about half of all working high school seniors average at least 20 hrs of work per week or what researchers have labeled intensive employment (Greenberger & Steinberg, 1986; National Research Council, 1998; Steinberg & Cauffman, 1995) .
According to a review by Entwisle, Alexander, and Olson (2000) , most researchers ignored the phenomenon of adolescent work prior to 1970. Starting in the 1970s, researchers took notice of the exceedingly common nature of adolescent work. At this point, the limited research on the effects of adolescent work emphasized what were thought to be the benefits of youth employment. Non-college-bound students who worked during high school did better in their post-high school employment than did nonworkers (Stephenson, 1981) , and employment appeared to reduce high school dropout (D'Amico, 1984) . The limited nature of this research did not stop a series of blue-ribbon national commissions from strongly recommending greater work experience among students with the belief that having a job would promote a sense of independence and self-esteem, structure a youth's leisure time, provide exposure to the world outside the classroom and neighborhood, and teach responsibility in the use of money (Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, 1979; National Commission on the Reform of Secondary Education, 1973; National Commission on Youth, 1980; National Panel on High School and Adolescent Education, 1976 ; Panel on Youth of the President's Science Advisory Committee, 1974) . Greenberger and Steinberg (1986) were the first researchers to point out the sharp dissonance between the weakness of the research on the correlates of youth employment and the strength of conclusions about its supposed benefits. They initiated an ambitious research agenda that thoroughly examined the developmental consequences of adolescent employment. This research repeatedly found that employment might not always be favorable. Indeed, they found that youth work was associated with a host of negative consequences, not the least of which were an increased risk of alcohol and drug use, delinquency, and other problem behaviors. Moreover, risk level was an increasing function of the number of hours of work, such that employment of
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more than 20 hrs per week (intensive work) created the highest risk. In her recent review of this literature, Mortimer (2003) notes that "[a]ll available evidence points to the conclusion that intensive work in adolescence is linked to problem behavior" (p. 164).
The impact of this research on policy makers was truly impressive. As noted above, a recent blue-ribbon commission recommended restrictions on work experience for school-going youths, restrictions that are now part of proposed federal legislation to amend the FLSA. Modern policy makers who deal with adolescent work are very careful to stress the primacy of school. The current federal attitude toward adolescent work is summed up by this statement by then-Secretary of Labor Alexis Herman in 2000: "Employers, parents, schools, and government must continue to support positive work experiences for our youngest workers-but with two critical caveats: They must be safe work experiences and work should never interfere with school" (U.S. Department of Labor, 2000, p. iii). In keeping with this orientation, the most expensive federal work program for adolescents, Job Corps (1.4 billion dollars in Fiscal Year 2004), is explicitly targeted at out-of-school youth. The ambitious 1994 School-to-Work Opportunities Act attempted to tie work more directly to schooling, with the explicit goal that work contribute to, rather than detract from, a student's educational experience. The Wage and Hours Division of the U.S. Department of Labor took aggressive action starting in the early 1990s to increase compliance with child labor laws, an effort that has contributed to a 40% decline in the proportion of youths who are illegally employed since the 1970s (Kruse & Mahoney, 1998) .
It is also possible that this new caution about youth employment has affected adolescent (and parent) behavior. Data from the Current Population Survey (CPS; Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2004) suggests that the proportion of 15-to 17-year-olds who work during the school year has declined 15% since the late 1970s. For example, in 1996 to 1998, 25% of 15-to 17-yearolds worked in any given week during the school year, compared to 30% in 1977 to 1979. The 30% decrease in youth employment during the summer is even more dramatic. The most recent numbers for July 2004 (the peak work month for adolescents) show that the proportion of 16-to 24-year-olds who were in the labor market was 67.2%-the lowest proportion since 1968 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2004) .
The Problem of Self-Selection
Despite a great deal of agreement in the empirical literature about the presence of the positive correlation between intensive adolescent employment and antisocial behavior, there remains considerable ambiguity about its causal significance. A growing body of research has begun to question whether the "negative effects attributed to working are instead effects of selection" (Entwisle et al., 2000, p. 281) . Because adolescents are not randomly allocated into the labor market, there are likely to be substantial preemployment differences between those who work and those who do not and among those who work at varying levels of intensity. Consequently, the commonly observed association between youth employment and problem behavior (or any other outcome of youth employment, for that matter) may be a spurious consequence of "unobserved population heterogeneity" (Nagin & Paternoster, 1991) rather than the causal effect of employment.
Although prior research has addressed the problem of selection bias through the use of controls for observed covariates and a lagged dependent variable (e.g., McMorris & Uggen, 2000; Ploeger, 1997; Steinberg, Fegley, & Dornbusch, 1993) , Paternoster et al. (2003) express reservations about this strategy. In particular, they fear that these studies have failed to eliminate bias in estimates of the work effect by inadequately controlling for all sources of heterogeneity that are correlated with both work and delinquency. Although covariates may control for observed differences, there may remain nontrivial sources of unobserved heterogeneity. The practical effect of this failure is classic omitted variables bias-the coefficient on the work measure will sweep up variation due to the effect of work (i.e., the true effect of work) as well as variation due to the effect of unobserved covariates that are correlated with work. The results of the still-growing body of empirical work in this area are supportive of the selection hypothesis. For example, Schoenhals, Tienda, and Schneider (1998) and Warren (2002) found no impact of working on school outcomes; Paternoster et al. (2003) recently found no impact of intensive school-year work on problem behavior; and Hotz, Xu, Tienda, and Ahituv (2002) found no impact on early adult male wages.
Types of Adolescent Jobs
The plausibility of selection effects raises the very real possibility of differential impacts of employment experience by the type of job in which adolescents are employed and by the structural position of the youth in the larger society. Greenberger, Steinberg, and Ruggiero (1982) have argued that the notion that a job is a job is a job is decidedly not borne out by their observations of young people in the workplace. In spite of the fact that a large proportion of youth employment is in the service sector, youth jobs differ along important dimensions such as the amount of supervision and autonomy they have as well as the opportunity to learn new skills .
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Aggregate data from the CPS (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2004) offer a useful description of the formal jobs available to adolescents. 3 Almost half (45.9%) of 16-and 17-year-olds are employed in the retail sector (e.g., eating and drinking establishments, grocery stores, department stores) and another one fifth (17.9%) in the service sector (e.g., entertainment and recreation, private households, professional services in health and education). The most common occupation held by adolescents is that of food service worker, followed by sales or counter clerk and cashier. Together, these occupations account for 44.8% of youth formal work.
These job patterns vary substantially by gender and race or ethnicity. Males are more likely to be employed in general labor (construction sector, stock handler or bagger, other labor) and farm work, whereas females are more likely to be employed as clerks or cashiers, in administrative support positions, and in private households. Black males and females are more likely to work in the service sector, and White females are more likely to work in informal jobs-patterns also discussed by others (Entwisle, Alexander, Olson, & Ross, 1999; Entwisle et al., 2000; U.S. Department of Labor, 2000) .
These patterns are corroborated by more recent survey research by Mortimer (2003) . She reported that at early ages, females are more likely to have informal jobs and to have difficulty transitioning into formal work than young males. She also found that job conditions differ dramatically by gender, even when young males and females are employed at the same location. Employed females spend a greater proportion of their work time dealing with people, whereas males are more likely to be engaged in manual activities; females receive more training, males are given more supervisory opportunities, and males perceive more job stress than females (Mortimer, 2003, pp. 44-80) . Other research has shown that not only are employment opportunities less prevalent for young minorities, the jobs they do secure tend to be qualitatively different from (read, not as good as) those available to White youths (Stack, 2002; Sullivan, 1989 Sullivan, , 1996 .
The premise of this article is that the proposed Youth Worker Protection Act will have an impact on both work intensity (intensive vs. moderate vs. nonwork) and job type (formal vs. informal) among young people. In the current environment, youths who are unable to work in the formal labor market shift to the informal labor market. We predict that this pattern will become more exaggerated if the Youth Worker Protection Act is enacted. However, existing research is not clear on whether formal and informal work have the same impact on adolescent behavior. Ours is the first analysis in the literature designed to differentiate between these two employment domains. We will also pay attention to the impact of employment separately by gender and racial or ethnic subgroups because different groups have different levels of work intensity and because the type of work tends to vary. In particular, CPS (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2004 ) data indicate that although males and females are equally likely to be employed in formal work, males work on average 2 to 4 hrs longer per week than females. Second, although the gender gap in work participation has narrowed and even closed in recent decades, the racial or ethnic gap has persisted over time. By virtually all accounts, adolescent employment is a suburban, White, middle-class phenomenon (Carr, Wright, & Brody, 1996; Greenberger & Steinberg, 1986; Marsh, 1991; National Research Council, 1998; U.S. Department of Labor, 2000) . Our analysis of the CPS indicates that White youths are the most likely to be employed in any given month (38.8%), followed by Hispanic youths (21.5%) and Black youths (16.3%). Conditional on being employed, however, the CPS shows that minority youths tend to work 2 to 4 hrs longer per week than White youths (see also National Research Council, 1998; U.S. Department of Labor, 2000) . If working intensively is harmful for youth, then, the impact of work on antisocial behavior may be felt more by males than for females, and for minorities than Whites.
DATA AND MEASURES
The data used in this study are from the first three waves of the NLSY97. This data set is the newest of six National Longitudinal Surveys sponsored by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department of Labor. The NLSY97 is a nationally representative sample of 8,984 youths born during the years 1980 through 1984 and living in the United States during the initial survey year in 1997. By design, the NLSY97 consists of a cross-sectional sample of respondents representative of all youths (n = 6,748) and an oversample of Black and Hispanic youths (n = 2,236). The initial interview took place in 1997, and follow-up interviews were conducted in 1998 and 1999. Of the 8,984 youths interviewed in 1997, 88.6% (n = 7,958) were also interviewed in 1998 and 1999. Listwise deletion of cases with missing data on employment and problem behavior results in our final sample of 7,467 youths.
4 All three waves of data are used in the panel analyses that follow. Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 1 , and a full list of variable definitions is available in Appendix B. it rather than i-that is, the unit of observation is the person-year, and the sample size is n × T rather than n. Means are calculated for valid data only. All estimates are weighted.
Employment Indicators
The key independent variable in our analysis is a measure of work involvement that combines information about job type, seasonality, and work intensity. The NLSY97 distinguishes between two types of employment: informal (freelance) work and formal (employee) work. Informal jobs are defined as "jobs for which the respondent performed one or a few tasks for several people without a specific boss or working for himself or herself," whereas formal jobs are defined as "a situation in which the respondent has an ongoing relationship with a specific employer" (Center for Human Resource Research, 2000, p. 73) . Youths report on formal jobs that they have worked since their 14th birthday and informal jobs that they have worked since their 12th birthday. By far, the most common informal occupations in the NLSY97 are babysitting (for girls) and yard work (for boys).
Using employment start and stop dates, we are able to determine whether a youth worked in a formal or informal job since the date of the past interview (or during the 12 months prior to the initial interview). For youths who worked in a formal job, we are also able to determine the mean number of hours they worked per week and whether they worked at least 1 week during the academic year or during the summer months only. A youth who worked all of his or her weeks in a formal job during the months of June, July, or August (and none during the school year) is employed in summer-only work. A youth who worked in a formal job for at least 1 week outside of these summer months is employed in school-year work. Additionally, we have sufficient data to categorize school-year employment by intensity level. A youth who worked more than 20 hrs per week on average is employed in intensive school-year work (i.e., high-intensity work). This measure is consistent with existing research and matches the limit imposed by the Youth Worker Protection Act. 6 Using this information, we create three dummy variables at each wave as our measure of work involvement: (a) worked intensively in a formal job during the school year (more than 20 hrs per week), (b) worked in a formal job during the summer months only, and (c) worked in an informal job. The reference group consists of nonemployed and moderately employed (20 hrs or less per week) youths. Note that at each wave, the three formal work categories (nonworking or moderate vs. intensive working vs. summer-only working) are mutually exclusive, but the formal and informal work categories are overlapping measures of work involvement.
7 Table 1 shows that three fourths of all youths (75.2%) worked in some kind of job during the 3 years under consideration.
8 Although overall gender differences in this table are muted (White females are actually the most likely, at 81.9%, to hold some kind of job), there are some differences in job participation by race and ethnicity. For example, about one half of White youths work in a formal job during the school year, whereas less than 40% of minority males and less than 35% of minority females do so. Summer-only jobs, on the other hand, are roughly equally prevalent across racial or ethnic groups among males, although less comparable for females. Among schoolyear workers, White youths are more likely to work moderately (1 to 20 hrs), whereas minority youths are more likely to work intensively (21+ hrs). White youths (especially White females) are also far more likely to work in an informal job than their non-White peers. Among females, informal jobs are the modal job type, whereas for males, formal school-year work is the modal job type.
Problem Behavior
In this article, we make use of variety scores of delinquency and substance use. We construct binary indicators for participation in each of the problem behaviors available in the NLSY97.
9 Youths who report engaging in each behavior on at least one occasion are coded 1, and all other youths are coded 0. Delinquency is the sum of seven binary indicators of participation in delinquent behavior since the past interview (or ever prior to the initial interview): vandalism, minor theft (items under $50), serious theft (items more than $50), other property crimes (e.g., receiving, possessing, or selling stolen property), aggravated assault (i.e., assault with the intent of inflicting serious harm), selling marijuana or other hard drugs, and carrying a handgun. The scale reliability coefficient (Cronbach's alpha) for this measure is .694 (for each of the first three waves, the coefficients are .700, .694, and .644). Substance use is the sum of three binary indicators for whether youths have smoked cigarettes, drunk alcohol, or used marijuana since the past interview (or ever prior to the initial interview). The scale reliability coefficient for this measure is .707 (for each of the first three waves, the coefficients are .739, .704, and .681). Because the 1997 problem behavior indicators measure lifetime prevalence (i.e., having ever engaged in the behavior prior to the interview) rather than annual prevalence, we also include dummy variables for the 1998 and 1999 interviews to control for consistent level differences (1997 is the reference year). Table 1 shows that minor theft (under $50) and vandalism are the most common types of delinquent offenses reported by youths in the NLSY97. Self-report rates for these offenses are highest among White males, at about 22% to 24%, followed by Hispanic males at 18% to 20%. The next most common offense is aggravated assault, with 13.1% of all youths having assaulted
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someone with the intent of inflicting serious harm. Self-report rates of assault are highest among males, particularly Black males (20.7%). Substance use is quite common in this sample, with more than half of youths reporting alcohol use (52.2%), two in five (40.6%) smoking cigarettes, and one in four (23.0%) using marijuana. Rates for these substance-use behaviors are consistently highest among White youths, and lowest for Black youths.
Control Variables
We also include an array of time-varying covariates to control for factors that might vary with both delinquency and employment. Because this is not primarily a criminological data set, we do not have time-varying measures of many criminological constructs, most notably peer or social learning measures, often included in studies of youth employment and problem behavior. However, these prior studies are typically cross-sectional with a lagged dependent variable (for a review, see Paternoster et al. 2003) . As such, they do not explicitly focus on within-individual change. Explicit controls for between-individual differences are not needed in this study because of the model's ability to control for unobserved heterogeneity. But this approach does not control for variables that vary over time and influence work and crime. As a partial remedy, we have measures of youth and family background including age (linear and quadratic), family structure, household size, residential mobility, census region, residential location, and community unemployment. School background includes enrollment status and age relative to grade (a proxy for grade retention). Individual differences include the perceived risk of arrest. To confront any biases resulting from missing data on our control variables, we code all missing values to zero and include a dummy variable to indicate that this adjustment was made. 10 We also include age dummies (ages 13 to 20; age 12 is the reference age) and the number of years after the previous interview as a measure of exposure time.
METHOD
To estimate a work effect purged of unobserved heterogeneity, we use three waves of data to estimate a random-effects Poisson model with controls for youth and family background, school background, and other individual differences.
11 This model accommodates unobserved heterogeneity by allowing each individual to have his or her own mean rate of problem behavior. The discrete random variable Y it is a variety score of antisocial behavior (delin-quency and substance use) that is distributed Poisson, with conditional density:
(1)
The parameter θ it is composed of a linear predictor ( ) βX it and a random, person-specific, unobserved effect ( ) µ i that enter the conditional mean function multiplicatively. That is,
where λ it = exp(βX it ) and α i = exp(µ i ). Taking logs, we obtain the log-linear formulation of the Poisson model:
The individual effect µ i accommodates heterogeneity in θ it across individuals. By assumption, α i = exp(µ i ) is distributed as a gamma random variable, with moments E(α i ) = 1 and V(α i ) = 1/δ, where δ is a parameter to be estimated. In the random-effects formulation, zero covariance is assumed between the random effect and the regressors: E(X it µ i ) = 0. Note that the first and second moments of the Poisson random variable Y it are E(Y it ) = λ it = exp(βX it ) and V(Y it ) = λ it + λ /δ it 2 , respectively.
12
To relax the assumption that the individual effect (µ i ) is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, our model focuses on within-individual variation in work status. Raudenbush and Bryk (2002, pp. 139-141 ; see also Brame, Bushway, & Paternoster, 1999, pp. 620-622) suggest doing this by decomposing the time-varying covariates into two parts: the mean for the individual across the three waves (X i ), and the difference from the individual-specific mean in each wave (X it -X i ). Our final log-linear model is thus of the form
In this model, the between-individual estimator, β B , is the vector of coefficients representing the mean difference in the logged rate of problem behavior during the three time periods between the different work status categories relative to nonworkers and moderate school-year workers. To the extent that we have not omitted relevant explanatory variables from the model, this component reflects the causal effect of employment on problem behavior. On the
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other hand, to the extent that there are important omitted variables, this coefficient is biased because X i is correlated with µ i , the individual effect. The within-individual estimator, β W , is the vector of coefficients representing the change in the logged rate of problem behavior corresponding to a unit change in work status (e.g., moving from nonwork or moderate work status to intensive school-year work status).
13 By construction, this component is uncorrelated with the stable individual effect, µ i , and therefore, the coefficient for this term is a consistent estimate of the true within-individual association between youth employment and problem behavior. We similarly decompose all other time-varying covariates into between-individual and within-individual variation (with the exception of our continuous measures of age).
RESULTS
Results for the random-effects models that decompose all explanatory variables into between and within-individual sources of variation are provided in Tables 2, 3 , and 4. A significant between-individual coefficient for a given work indicator will tell us that there are important preemployment differences among youths in different employment situations, whereas a significant within-individual coefficient will tell us that a change in work status has an important impact on delinquency and substance use. Table 2 reports the results for the full sample, Table 3 reports gender-specific and race-specific models for delinquency, and Table 4 reports gender-specific and racespecific models for substance use. For ease of presentation, each of these tables omits the control variables, although the results for the full models are available on request from the authors.
As a way to illustrate the usefulness of distinguishing youth employment by job type (formal vs. informal), seasonality (school-year vs. summer), and work hours (nonwork or moderate work vs. intensive work), we present the results with the full sample for five different models in Table 2 . Models 1 through 4 include the work indicators with only age dummies, year of interview dummies, and exposure as control variables (the coefficients for these control variables are not shown). Model 1 includes a single binary indicator for employment in any type of job. Model 2 distinguishes youth employment by job type by including separate indicators for formal and informal work. Model 3 incorporates seasonality in formal work, specifying whether it took place during school months or only during summer months. Model 4 distinguishes school-year work by whether it was of high intensity (more than 20 hrs a week). This model incorporates our full set of indicators of work
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(text continues on p. 354) involvement. Finally, Model 5 is a replication of Model 4 that includes all control variables and represents our fully specified model. For our measure of any type of adolescent employment (Model 1 of  Table 2 ), the between-individual coefficients for both delinquency and substance use are highly significant statistically and substantively, indicating that compared with nonworkers, youths who are employed are, on average, more likely to engage in both delinquency and substance use.
14 This is consistent with previous research that has typically found a positive correlation between measures of adolescent work and antisocial behavior. It also, however, validates our concern about selection effects in light of the within-individual coefficients. These coefficients, which capture the effect of a unit change from the individual-specific mean in work status, show that a change from nonworker to worker significantly increases the risk of delinquency (b = .061, p < .05) and substance use (b = .074, p < .01). Note, however, that the impact of within-individual change is much smaller-exponentiated, the effects are 1.063 for delinquency and 1.077 for substance use, representing an increase in problem behavior of 6.3% and 7.7%, respectively. Nevertheless, even when we condition on unobserved heterogeneity, those who become workers are indeed at higher risk of delinquency and substance use.
In Model 2, we extend the work of Paternoster and colleagues (2003) and distinguish between formal and informal work. Consistent with a selection effect, the between-individual coefficients again show that on average, formal workers engage in more delinquency and substance use than nonworkers, whereas informal workers engage in more substance use but less delinquency. Note also that the between-individual coefficients for formal work are quite large. In terms of the impact of work, however, change in formal work status is not a statistically or substantively significant predictor of change in problem behavior. A change in informal work status, on the other hand, does impact behavior by putting youths at significantly greater risk for both delinquency and substance use.
In Model 3 of Table 2 , we further disaggregate formal work into schoolyear work and summer-only work. It is interesting to note here that almost all of the between-individual coefficients are positive and statistically significant. This means that, on average, youths who work formally during the school year, during the summer months only, or who work in informal jobs are more likely to use illegal substances than nonworking youths. Moreover, formal workers are more likely to be delinquent, on average, whereas informal workers are less likely to be delinquent. These results are again consistent with a selection effect. Contrary to previous research, however, a change in status from not working to working during the school year is not criminogenic-the within-individual coefficient for school-year formal work for both delinquency and substance use is not significantly different from zero. Other types of jobs do seem to matter, however. The withinindividual coefficients show that youths who become summer-only workers are at greater risk of delinquency but not for substance use. Furthermore, youths who become informal workers are at significantly greater risk for both delinquency and substance use.
In Model 4, we distinguish school-year work by whether it was of high intensity (more than 20 hrs a week). In previous research, it was such highly intensive school-year work that has been consistently found to be positively related to delinquency and problem behavior. In Model 5, we include all of the work measures as in Model 4 but add the full set of our control variables. This model thus controls for both observed and unobserved sources of population heterogeneity. The basic results of Model 4 are replicated in Model 5. In both models, we find that the between-individual coefficient for intensive school-year work is highly significant, suggesting that they are indeed more delinquent and more likely to use substances on average. For informal workers, again we see that they are significantly more likely to use substances on average, and marginally less likely to be delinquent (although the coefficient changes sign from Model 4 to Model 5). The within-individual coefficients, however, suggest that a change in work status from either nonwork or moderate school-year work to intensive work does not increase the risk of either delinquency or substance use. Contrary to previous research, therefore, in the full sample, we fail to find any evidence that intensive work during the school year is harmful for adolescents. A change in status to becoming a summeronly worker does put one at risk for delinquency but not substance use. A change from not working to informal work appears to be detrimental as well, putting youth at elevated risk for both types of problem behaviors. These findings clearly raise some important issues about any policy, such as the Youth Worker Protection Act, that might shift a large number of youths from formal into informal work.
Before moving on, it would be helpful to take stock of the important findings in Table 2 . First of all, we find that youths who work intensively during the school year are indeed more delinquent and more likely to use drugs, on average, than youths who do not work or who work moderately (fewer than 20 hrs per week). These findings validate concerns that researchers interested in the adolescent work effect must contend with pronounced selection effects. Intensive school-year workers are not distributed randomly in the population of all adolescents-high-risk youths tend to gravitate toward intensive employment during the school year more so than lower-risk youths. Second, compared with nonworking and moderately working youths, adolescents who transition into intensive formal employment during the school year do not put themselves at greater risk for problem behavior. Contrary to previous findings, we see no evidence that intensive employment during the school year is harmful with respect to antisocial behavior. We do find, however, that those who become summer-only workers increase their delinquency (but not substance use). Clearly, then, summer employment will not lead to a decline in crime-a key claim of policy makers who advocate summer jobs as a crime prevention tool (Rosenwald, 2003) . This result is also consistent with the evidence from evaluations of summer-job programs for at-risk youths who show no decline in crime and in one case an increase in crime (Bushway & Reuter, 2002) . We also find that informal workers put themselves at greater risk for both delinquency and substance use. This finding is particularly relevant in light of policy recommendations that would restrict youth access to formal work. We next investigate the as yet unanswered question as to whether these results hold up for youths of different gender and racial or ethnic backgrounds.
Delinquency by Gender and Race or Ethnicity
Results for the relationship between the various indicators of adolescent employment and delinquency by gender and race subgroups are reported in Table 3 . With respect to the between-individual coefficients for intensive school-year work, we find that they are positive and significant for White males and all females but nonsignificant for minority males. Preemployment differences in delinquency, therefore, are present for all but Black and Hispanic males. A significance test for the difference between slopes finds that the between-individual coefficient for Hispanic females is significantly different from that for White males (p < .05) and Black females (p < .10).
Contrary to Newman's (1999) ethnographic research, we find no evidence that prospective employers of Black adolescents who work intensively during the school year are skimming off the very best, least delinquent youth. None of the between-individual coefficients for summer-only workers are significant for any race or gender group. There is, however, evidence of selection effects for informal work, at least within some groups. The between-individual coefficients for Black and Hispanic males and Black females are significant, indicating that these informal workers had higher levels of delinquency over the three waves than other youths.
With respect to the within-individual coefficients, which capture the effect of a change in work status, one of the most striking findings in Table 3 is that there is no evidence that intensive school-year work is harmful for any gender or race subgroup; for no group is the coefficient significantly different from zero. Contrary to much previous research, we conclude that the intensive-school-year-work-is-not-harmful finding that we reported in Table 2 for the full sample is exceptionally robust across gender-race subgroups. At least as it pertains to involvement in delinquency, it holds for males and females as well as among White, Black, and Hispanic youths. A change to summer-only employment has no significant effect on delinquency for any gender-race subgroup except White males. The finding in Table 2 that summer-only work puts youth at risk for delinquency is, therefore, identified only by the group of White males and, to a lesser extent, Black males (the coefficient is nonsignificant but quite large for this group). Nonworking White males who become summer-only workers engage in approximately 18.1% more delinquent behavior when they change statuses (e .166 -1), whereas the corresponding figure for Black males is 16.4%.
A change from nonworker to informal worker is benign for White and Black youths (both males and females). However, there is some marginal evidence that for Hispanic males and females, taking on informal work is significantly related to an increase in delinquent conduct. 15 Our finding in Table 2 that informal work does put youths at some risk of delinquency is, therefore, identified only by Hispanic youths. Nonworking Hispanic males who enter the informal labor market engage in 15.1% more delinquency when they become informal workers (e .141 -1), whereas Hispanic females engage in 27.6% more delinquency. We know of no a priori reason why informal work would have such a prominent effect on Hispanics, particularly females, but we cannot ignore the fact that something happens when they enter the informal labor market.
Substance Use by Gender and Race or Ethnicity
In Table 3 , we reported that the between-individual coefficient for intensive school-year work in the delinquency model was significant for White males and all females. These findings are corroborated for substance use in Table 4 . Again indicative of very strong selection effects, the between-individual coefficients for intensive school-year work on substance use suggest that females and White males who work intensively during the school year are significantly more likely to have used harmful substances across the three waves of data than either moderate or nonworking youths. There is only weak evidence of between-individual differences in substance use for summer-only workers (among Black females) but significant betweenindividual differences for informal workers among Black and Hispanic females (with marginal differences among Black males).
Perhaps the most startling finding in Table 4 is that becoming an intensive school-year worker is unrelated to substance use for all race and gender
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groups. Table 4 shows that none of the within-individual coefficients for substance use is significantly different from zero. We say startling because there is a virtual consensus among youth employment researchers that if intensive adolescent employment has any harmful effect, it is in placing them at elevated risk involvement in alcohol and drug use (Johnson, in press; McMorris & Uggen, 2000; Mortimer, 2003; Staff & Uggen, 2003) . We find no evidence that intensive school-year work leads to increased substance use among any race or gender group once there are rigorous controls for unobserved differences in heterogeneity (heterogeneity we know to exist from the significant between-individual coefficients).
Becoming a summer worker has no significant effect on substance use among any race and gender group. The transition into informal work is related to substance use only among White and Hispanic females and, to a lesser extent, Hispanic males. The magnitude of the effect for White females is quite small; nonworkers who become informal workers engage in only 7.8% more substance use (e .075 -1). Hispanic females who enter the informal labor force engage in 18.0% more substance use and Hispanic males 15.5% more (e .144 ). For Hispanic females and Hispanic males, then, taking on informal work is correlated with an increased risk of both delinquency (Table 3) and substance use (Table 4) .
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
There has been widespread agreement in the adolescent employment literature that intensive work during high school is correlated with elevated involvement in a variety of problem behaviors, including delinquency and drug and alcohol use. This agreement has led directly to public policy recommendations (and proposed legislation) that would expand federal restrictions on adolescent formal work intensity to 16-and 17-year-olds. However, recent work using panel data to control for selection has raised some doubts about the causal significance of the findings motivating these policy recommendations, at least with respect to problem behavior. This article extends Paternoster et al.'s (2003) exploration of the impact of formal work on problem behavior by estimating random-effects models separately for gender and racial or ethnic subgroups. Although we find that those who work intensively in formal jobs are more delinquent and abuse substances more often than those who do not, we find no evidence that a transition into intensive work in formal jobs during the school year, relative to moderate work or nonwork, leads to an increase in delinquency or substance use.
These two findings in tandem might seem counterintuitive to the social learning theorist. Delinquent youths self-select into jobs with delinquent others, yet this by itself does not lead to an increase in crime. Researchers using very similar techniques to those used in this article have indeed found that (a) delinquent youths self-select into gangs and detention centers and (b) gang membership and time in a detention center amplify the criminal activity of these youths (Bayer, Pintoff, & Pozen, 2004; Gordon et al., 2004) . But formal jobs are not, at least on average, like gangs or detention centers. We know that delinquent youths flock together outside of work (Warr, 2002) and do not need the labor market to help them sort into delinquent groups. Moreover, the amount of supervision at a formal job at least rivals that at school, and the nature of peer involvement at work is both more prosocial and less intensive than peer involvement in gangs or detention centers. In our view, the question is not whether formal jobs are harmful but whether youths would benefit more from being in other prosocial settings like the school or home.
It is important, then, to be clear about what our results do not say. For example, our findings say nothing about the other possible deleterious effects of intensive school-year work on learning and future life outcomes. Our findings also do not support the claim that employment during adolescence leads to a decline in delinquency and problem behavior. Our results in that respect are consistent with a large literature showing that job programs aimed at delinquent or at-risk youth have little or no impact on either their employment or their criminal behavior (Bushway & Reuter, 2002; Uggen, 2000) .
Our article also builds on earlier research by looking at other types of employment besides formal jobs during the school year. Specifically, we examine the impact of work that takes place exclusively during the summer as well as work in informal jobs. In each case, we find that within-individual movement into these types of work can actually be problematic, at least for some gender and racial or ethnic subgroups. Although our classification is not as refined as existing research that attempts to identify the characteristics of better jobs within the class of formal jobs (e.g., Staff & Uggen, 2003) , our findings do have direct policy relevance. For example, cities across the United States spend millions of dollars on summer job programs for at-risk youths under the assumption that it will prevent crime. Existing evaluations of these summer programs show no support for this claim (Bushway & Reuter, 2002) , and our results actually suggest that summer-only work may lead to more delinquency for White males and perhaps Black males.
Finally, prior research that finds that intensive employment in formal jobs leads to increased problem behavior has led directly to a policy recommendation by the National Research Council (1998), followed up by proposed federal legislation, to limit the formal work intensity of 16-and 17-year-olds.
However, data from the NLSY97 strongly suggest that youths who do not work in formal jobs are likely to work in informal jobs (see Figure 1) . And, our results unambiguously demonstrate that movement into informal work will lead to increased problem behavior for some groups. 16 Our models suggest that informal work is harmful for Hispanic males and females as well as White males for delinquency and for Hispanic males and females as well as White females for substance use. We do not know exactly why informal work has this positive correlation with substance use and delinquency. 17 It may be that informal jobs (babysitting, lawn care, paper route, etc.) provide youths with little opportunity to develop conventional skills or accumulate human capital and may involve very little supervision or mentoring by adults. Because informal workers also tend to be immediately remunerated for their efforts (instead of having to wait for a paycheck that arrives only every 2 weeks, for example), a quick infusion of cash may present more expansive opportunities to put deviant impulses into action. An important line of future research would thus determine what elements of informal employment (the working conditions, the type of work, the pay and pay schedule) cause it to be detrimental for some youths.
Even without this additional research however, we believe it is still prudent to recommend against policies that would encourage young people to work in the informal rather than the formal labor market. As noted above, our evidence does not suggest that formal employment during adolescence should be encouraged or pushed as the cure to all problems among American teenagers. Indeed, there is evidence that America's enthusiasm for youth work has dimmed considerably during the past 10 years. But we also believe that our results, conducted with sophisticated statistical methods on nationally representative data, should provide a strong caution to policy makers who might seek to impose strict limitations on employment in the formal labor market such as those contained in the Youth Worker Protection Act. Given that these youths are currently working at much higher levels than 20 hrs per week, the proposed restrictions may displace a nontrivial proportion of these young formal workers into the informal labor market, where they may become involved in more problem behaviors than if they had stayed in the formal labor market. . Presently, the child labor provisions of the FLSA ban employment of youths under 14 years of age, although exceptions for informal work (e.g., babysitting, yard work, paper routes) and farm work (especially on a family farm) are allowed. Youths 14 and 15 years of age may work outside of school hours but are prohibited from working in occupations other than retail, food service, and gasoline service. Their employment is restricted to no more than 18 hrs per week or 3 hrs per day when school is in session and to no more than 40 hrs per week or 8 hrs per day when school is not in session. They are also restricted to working between 7 a.m. and 7 p.m. except during the summer, when they may work evenings until 9 p.m. Youths 16 and 17 years of age may work in any occupation that is not deemed hazardous for this age group (e.g., mining, meatpacking, operating certain types of machinery). These youths are allowed to work any time of the day, any day of the year, and for unlimited hours. Youths 18 years of age and older are no longer subject to the child labor provisions of the FLSA. Every state also has its own child labor law that may be more or less restrictive than the provisions of the federal law.
2. The bill died in committee, but a version of the bill will be submitted again in the 109th Congress. This information was acquired through personal correspondence with the office of Representative Tom Lantos of California, the bill's sponsor.
3. These are original estimates that we calculated using the merged outgoing rotation groups from the Current Population Survey (1980 Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2004) , a monthly survey conducted by the Bureau of the Census that provides household data on all persons ages 16 and older.
4. Approximately 15% of the cases were lost to attrition during the three time periods. A comparison of those lost to attrition with those who stayed in the panel revealed only a few minor differences by Wave 1 characteristics. For example, those lost to attrition were more likely to work intensively, live with a stepparent, be male, and live in the Northeast, but were less likely to work in an informal job.
5. Because of the oversampling of Black and Hispanic youths, all youths age 12 to 16 at yearend 1996 in the United States did not have an equal probability of being selected to participate in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97). To take into account this differential selection probability and to generalize to the population of all youths, each respondent is assigned a normed sampling weight that is applied in all statistical analyses. Additionally, because the NLSY97 data were collected by way of a multistage, stratified random sample, respondents are clustered in geographical areas (primary sampling units, or PSUs). Depending on the degree of homogeneity, standard errors computed by conventional means (which assume a simple random sample) risk being underestimated. We thus use variable-specific design effects to adjust for clustering. Because the software is not yet available for direct estimation of the correct standard errors in random-effects models, we first estimate design effects for each variable using models that are identical except for the random effect. We then use these to adjust the standard errors in the random-effects models.
6. We also conducted a comprehensive series of sensitivity analyses where we varied the construction of our formal work intensity measure. First, we estimated models where the number of hours worked per week was kept as a continuous variable. Second, we estimated models where we categorized workers as intensive if they worked more than the median number of hours for
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their specific gender, race, and age group. Third, we used a minimum of 4 weeks at more than 20 hrs per week as our cutoff for intensive work. In each case, these supplementary models track precisely with those reported in the body of the article.
7. We also conducted all analyses employing a four-category measure of formal work status in which we break out the nonworkers and moderate workers who were employed 20 or fewer hrs per week. Some researchers have found that moderate workers are better off than nonworkers in terms of dropout and other life outcomes (Mortimer, 2003; Warren, 2002) . The most common finding in the criminological literature is that moderate workers are similar to nonworkers in terms of problem behavior. In keeping with this finding, we do not find much difference between moderate workers and nonworkers. In addition, the proposed legislation is focused on the issue of intensive formal work. Therefore, for ease of interpretation and to minimize clutter, we do not differentiate between moderate and nonworkers in the final model.
8. The data in Table 1 are indexed by it rather than i, meaning that the unit of observation is the person-year instead of the person. For simple descriptive purposes, we treat each person-year as an independent observation. 9. Although the work measures in the NLSY97 are more comprehensive than those found in the typical study of work and crime, the available measures of delinquency in the NLSY97 are more limited than the measures available in other criminological data sets. For example, there are only 7 questions on delinquency compared with more than 20 in the National Youth Survey. However, a detailed comparison of the measures that are included has validated the included measures (Bushway, Paternoster, Brame, & Apel, 2000, pp. 17-37) . The substance-use measures are very comparable to the measures used in other studies.
10. This procedure is necessary for only two variables (refer to Table 1 ) because for the remaining covariates, the proportion of the sample with missing data is less than 1%.
11. For a survey of panel models, see Greene (2003) , Hsiao (1986) , and Petersen (1993) . The present overview of panel models for count data is motivated by Cameron and Trivedi (1998); Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984); and Winkelmann (2000) .
12. This is the so-called Negbin II variance function (quadratic in the mean) introduced by Trivedi (1986, 1998) . We evaluate the robustness of the results from the randomeffects Poisson model by estimating the more general random-effects negative binomial model, which accommodates overdispersion in the distribution of the conditional mean. The randomeffects negative binomial model does this by specifying α i as a beta random variable with two unknown parameters (compared to a gamma random variable with one unknown parameter in the random-effects Poisson model). Results from this model were virtually identical to those obtained from the Poisson.
13. There is a substantial amount of change in employment status to identify the models. Approximately 56% of the observations changed on intensive school-work status during the time period studied, and 45% of the informal work observations changed employment status. There is considerably less change for summer-only work (16%), which explains the large standard errors we observe for this indicator of work status.
14. Note that these are Poisson regression coefficients that, when exponentiated, represent the proportional increase or decrease (evaluated at the sample mean, because Poisson is nonlinear) in problem behavior associated with a unit increase in the explanatory variable. A unit increase in the between-individual work indicator represents a comparison between youths who do not work at all during the three waves (mean = 0.0) with youths who work during all three waves (mean = 1.0). To illustrate, the exponentiated between-individual coefficient for any employment in the delinquency model is 1.328 (e .284 = 1.328), meaning that youths who are employed during all three waves engage in 1.328 times as many delinquent behaviors, or 32.8% Intensive school-year work = 1 if youth worked in a formal job more than 21 hrs per week during school.
APPENDIX B Variable Definitions
Summer-only work = 1 if youth worked in a formal job during the summer months only.
Informal work = 1 if youth worked in an informal job.
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